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Article
Illegal drugs in the UK: Is it time
for considered legalisation to
improve public health?
Phil Dalgarno1, Steve O’Rawe2 and Richard Hammersley3
Abstract
This paper investigates options available to policy makers responding to the challenges of drug use in modern society,
focussing on the UK. It investigates the failings of prohibition policy that has driven historic reactions to drugs, drug use
and drug users globally, nationally and locally. This policy paradigm has been largely destructive and counter-productive
and has led to a whole host of health and social problems. The authors have approached their investigation from a public
health perspective, free from moral biases that have driven many policy initiatives until now. Many countries and regions
of the world are rejecting prohibition as they move towards public health models in opposition to criminal justice
responses, and this trend is continuing. Four policy models are examined; prohibition as the status quo; extension of
prohibition to include alcohol and other drugs; decriminalisation; legalisation and regulation of all drugs. Each of these
policy options are contested; none have universal support. However, given careful consideration, this paper proposes
that our only way out of the public health and criminal justice crises that have been driven by drug policy globally is to
adopt the more contentious option of legalisation and regulation of all drugs commonly used non medically.
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Introduction
Since 1961 when the UN Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs was published, there has been a prolif-
eration in the use of illegal drugs to levels previously
unimagined, although the convention and subsequent
supply reduction activity were supposed to curtail and
contain use. Before 1961 in the UK, the use of con-
trolled drugs occurred mainly amongst a small bohe-
mian milieu, including jazz musicians and some
immigrant groups (Courtwright, 2002; Kohn, 2003).
Almost sixty years on, lifetime prevalence of cannabis
use amongst adults is above 20% in many European
countries (EMCDDA, 2018a, 2018b), with Uruguay,
Canada and several states in the USA introducing leg-
islation to legalise the production, distribution and sale
of the drug, Mexico and Jamaica expected to follow
suit and many other countries relaxing prohibitive
measures (Global Commission on Drug Policy
(GCDP), 2018).
The prevalence of other drugs has also risen, includ-
ing some drugs, such as MDMA, not used at all in
1961. New drugs, such as mephedrone, are being sold
and consumed and the market for new psychoactive
substances is growing (Miliano et al., 2018).
Background
Supply reduction has not contained or reduced preva-
lence, despite huge investment and extreme police and
military activity (Harm Reduction International, 2017).
Instead it has created a highly profitable criminal black
market, resulting in violence and corruption, locally,
nationally and globally (McCoy, 2003). Some drug
entrepôt countries are on the verge of collapse as effec-
tive states (McCoy, 2003; Shirk, 2011) and global net-
works initially used for drugs are now used also for
weapons, illicit donor organs, people smuggling and,
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indeed, any in-demand illegal commodity (Lichtenwald
et al., 2009).
There is a substantial and undiminishing demand for
illicit drugs that is currently being met by an entirely
illegal, untaxed and unregulated industry, run by inter-
national criminal networks, which is one of the largest
industries in the world (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2018). For example, the
total global cannabis retail market in 2005 was estimat-
ed as between £35 billion and £105 billion ($57 billion
and $170 billion) (Reuter and Trautmann, 2009). The
total global value of the illicit drugs trade may be
£236bn (Godlee, 2018), all of it controlled by those
criminal networks to fund their activities and denying
governments any revenue through taxation. Yet, in
each of six USA states that have legalised the sale of
cannabis (Alaska, California, Colorado, Nevada and
Oregon), over $1bn has been collected in tax revenue.
Remarkably, all six states collect more revenue from
their excise taxes on cannabis than from their excise
taxes on beer and wine. Two states, Colorado and
Nevada, collect more from their cannabis excise taxes
than from their excise taxes on all alcohol, including
liquor, wine, and beer. And in Washington State,
cannabis excise taxes are nearly on par with excise
tax revenue from all forms of alcohol. (Davis et al.,
2019: 21)
The economic argument for regulated sales of cannabis
seems attractive, but it is opposed by a drug prohibi-
tionist policy stance. These tensions will be further
borne out as more States in the USA continue to
adopt new drug policies.
The primary concern of this paper is public health.
The fact that many psychoactive substances are illegal
has not prevented people from using them. At mini-
mum, a large minority of users take them in harmful
ways with substantial personal and social costs. From a
public health perspective, this is barely different from
the problems of alcohol and tobacco use, except that
the industry generates no tax revenue, which can sup-
port treatment and rehabilitation for those who devel-
op problems, and is beyond regulation. The paper will
not discuss the economics of drugs policy because the
relevant figures are enormous, involve estimates of the
costs of intangibles such as harm to families, and
involve estimates of the activities of a secretive
industry.
Despite intensive resistance by the tobacco industry,
cigarette smoking has been tackled by obtaining
unequivocal research evidence that smoking is harmful,
regulating the sale and marketing of cigarettes and
changing social norms about smoking, including devel-
oping the widespread perception that smoking is not
worth the health risks. In about forty years, smoking
prevalence in the UK has dropped to about a quarter
of its peak. Since 1974, smoking in the UK has fallen
from just below 50% of the adult population to just
below 20% (ONS, 2018). The ban of smoking in public
places has been a major public health benefit also
(Anyanwu et al., 2018). The industry, however, has
increasingly diverted its sales efforts to less regulated
markets in the developing world (Drope et al., 2018).
While the costs of smoking are high and the dangers
well documented, few would call for outright prohibi-
tion. Due largely to the known dangers of the unin-
tended consequences of such action that led to the
repeal of alcohol prohibition in the US, but still persists
with other, less harmful, psychoactive drugs.
Alcohol also harms public health and its sale and
marketing can be regulated, by various means includ-
ing pricing and taxation, voluntary industry coopera-
tion and by changes in social norms. Over the past
forty years, gross UK alcohol intake, and consequent
harms, has increased. Cheaper alcohol may be one
reason for this, perhaps partially solvable by minimum
pricing (Ludbrook et al., 2012). Although the alcohol
industry is not public health’s ‘friend’ (Wallack, 1992),
the industry does, for example, under pressure, regulate
to some extent the marketing of its products (see port-
mangroup.org.uk). It also resists pressure from public
health, for example continuing to sponsor sport and
music events. For example, the Scotch Whisky
Association (SWA) has, for over four years, actively
opposed minimum unit pricing (MUP) of alcohol in
Scotland – a cross-party, widely supported initiative
(Alcohol Focus Scotland, 2016). Despite their efforts
to stymie the Act, MUP is now operational in
Scotland, and one year on from its introduction has
received positive evaluation and has shown to decrease
the volume of total alcohol consumption (Mooney and
Carlin, 2019). Social norms about alcohol that have
also changed for the better include intolerance of
alcohol-related violence, including domestic violence
(Livingston, 2011), and reduced drunk-driving
(Alcohol Concern, 2009).
No such options are available for illegal drugs.
Repeated commission reports and public discussions
about appropriate norms tend to get buried or dis-
missed as sending the “wrong message” (Smith,
2009). Apparently, the only politically acceptable
option is to document the harms caused by illegal
drugs and use these as rationalisations for their gener-
ally unsuccessful suppression. Yet, for many drugs the
harms are less than for alcohol or tobacco (Nutt et al.,
2010). Moreover, although drugs can be potent deter-
minants of health and disease, in primary care settings,
drug users have obvious motives for being discreet
about these behaviours, including concerns about
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being stigmatised as drug users, which can have a
knock-on detrimental effect on their individual recov-
eries (McPhee et al., 2013). These dampen efforts to
practice preventative medicine and minimise harm.
Recent changes to regulate cannabis instead of ban-
ning it may be encouraging, but it is unclear that can-
nabis is a special case, any more than alcohol or
tobacco. Drug harms are more to do with the mindset
of users and the settings of use, including the extent to
which products are quality controlled, fairly priced and
can be obtained safely (Shewan and Dalgarno, 2005).
The arguments
There are four options open to us: (1) Leave things as
they are; (2) Extend laws to ban alcohol and tobacco;
(3) Decriminalise or depenalise some or all currently
illegal drugs; (4) Legalise and regulate some or all cur-
rently illegal drugs.
Let us consider some implications of each of these
options in turn.
Option 1: Leave our drug laws – national and inter-
national – as they are and continue as we have done for
the past half a century.
Current drug laws effectively criminalise millions of
otherwise law-abiding citizens and perpetuate a vast
illegal and unregulated industry. Unregulated, the
industry can sell adulterated products, products that
are in particularly dangerous formulations, and prod-
ucts that are bogus. These can be sold by anyone, to
anyone, with no requirement for responsible market-
ing, or packaging that explains how to minimise risk,
or offers informed choice between different products,
or provides any rules or norms about appropriate use.
The unpredictable content of ‘drugs’ makes what is
already a risky pastime considerably more so. Taking
heroin as an example, the illegality of the trade together
with an unreliable supply can have the effect of making
the end product questionable in terms of both content
and strength. Even minor fluctuations in potency can
result in deaths. Leaving things as they are, abdicates
health and safety controls to a criminalised industry
and the folklore of drug users. In recent years, deaths
from overdose in the USA, for example, have risen
sharply, much of it related to the increase in fentanyl-
laced street heroin (Ciccarone, 2017). The appeal of
fentanyl for the black market is largely that it is very
potent, making it easy to smuggle in small quantities
containing many doses.
Yet, UK governments have generally focussed on
supply reduction rather than regulation and treatment
rather prevention. There are complex reasons for
favouring the status quo, including unknown pressures
from powerful lobbies such as the alcohol, tobacco and
pharmaceutical industries and concerns regarding
media opprobrium (see Hammersley, 2018;
Hammersley and Reid, 2002).
Option 2: We can extend the existing laws to include
currently legal substances known to be harmful; this
would mean that alcohol and tobacco would come
within the domain of the various national and interna-
tional laws and their amendments.
The extension of existing drug laws to encompass
currently legal substances with proven and irrefutable
links to personal and social harms, specifically alcohol
and tobacco (Nutt et al., 2010) may, on the face of it,
be attractive to many. This would be a logical move in
that it would categorize two of the more harmful and
most widely available substances where they should
properly be. However, one particular flaw with this is
that alcohol in particular is culturally integrated, enor-
mously popular, and its use associated with celebra-
tions and festivals. Moderate imbibers (of whom
there are many) would be penalised for the transgres-
sions of the immoderate. We already have a plethora of
legislation to regulate the product, as well as the
adverse social problems associated, from weights and
measures to drink driving.
A more concrete problem would be the almost
instant creation of a further black market for criminal
cartels. Alcohol prohibition was famously tested in
America in the 1920’s and resulted in some health
improvements, but coupled with considerable public
health and safety problems (Levine and Reinarman,
2004) and the proliferation of highly organised criminal
gangs (McCoy, 2003). The repeal of prohibition in 1933
saw these same criminal organisations move seamlessly
into the supply and distribution of other intoxicants,
heroin in particular (McCoy, 2003; Musto, 1999).
During Covid-19 lockdowns, alcohol bans in Sri
Lanka and South Africa began causing public health
problems and losing government revenue almost
immediately.
Making illegal something that people enjoy – and
plainly, this is the principal motivation for intoxicant
use with most people – does not stop them from want-
ing it, and it does not stop the drugs industries from
meeting those desires. Illegality pushes up prices, and
places many useful public health controls beyond the
law. Also, the arguments against option 1 apply even
more so to the possibility of all major intoxicants being
illegal.
A more effective approach might be to make alcohol
socially unacceptable, as is being achieved to an extent
with drunk driving and violence whilst intoxicated.
Conversely, when a widely used drug is illegal, then
both the law and medical advice can seem biased and
hypocritical to users, who may largely disregard official
warnings as lacking credibility. Current blanket bans
on any illegal drug, anytime, anywhere are increasingly
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detached from reality in a society where, for example,
the current Prime Minister has admitted to adolescent
cannabis and cocaine use (Dawar, 2008).
The prohibition of alcohol would have enormous
implications for public health. On the face of it, such
a move should theoretically lead to improvements, but
in reality, the situation would be almost identical to
that of the illicit drugs market, which is to say that
while consumption would continue, we would see a
corresponding drop in purity/quality, an increase in
adulterants as individuals (or organisations) attempt
to produce their own, and an inevitable increase in
negative health outcomes. Prohibition of alcohol
would also result in a sharp and very steep rise in
cost, affording even greater financial rewards to crim-
inals. In the end, it seems a much more preferable
option to have better regulation of cost, availability
and training for staff in order to reduce alcohol related
harm (Babor et al., 2010).
Option 3: We can introduce the decriminalisation or
depenalisation of some/all drugs, as the Scottish
National Party has adopted as a future policy for the
Scottish Government (Chiara, 2019) and as has been
adopted in Portugal where all drug offences are now
civil not criminal offences.
In Portugal, and most other places, it does not seem
to have made much difference (Hughes and Stevens,
2010). For example, public health in Portugal remains
frustrated that harm reduction and treatment facilities
remain limited and drug injectors continue to live and
inject in squalid conditions. While drug supply itself
remains illegal the industry cannot be taxed or regulat-
ed. There can be positive public health gains, such as
reduction in blood borne virus infection and drug
injecting (Cabral, 2017; Greenwald, 2009) but there is
a danger of conflating recreational use with problem
use, with increased referral to ‘treatment’ for those who
deem it unnecessary. This approach risks contributing
to the widely-held, but mistaken belief, that drug users,
of any description, ‘need’ to be ‘treated’.
Decriminalisation is an imperfect compromise; it
looks good in theory but the reality is that it is unwork-
able without a number of different authorities and offi-
cial bodies being prepared to “turn a blind eye”. A
decriminalised drug is not legal, nor strictly illegal,
depending on certain circumstances, nor is it necessar-
ily of any better quality as it comes from the same
sources as any other illegal drug. To use the
Netherlands as an example: cannabis is decriminalised
and can be sold in licensed coffeeshops to consumers
over the age of 18 in amounts up to 5 grams. However,
this process has many problems. For one, coffeeshops
are not legally permitted to hold more than 500 grams
of cannabis for sale at any one time. Further, growing
cannabis on the premises, and the transportation of
cannabis from A (the producer) to B (the retail
outlet) is forbidden by law. And yet, all three of these
problems are circumvented by simply ignoring the
laws. This state of affairs can only really exist with
the goodwill of the law enforcement services, some-
thing that can, hypothetically at least, disappear at
any time. This is an ad hoc relationship, meaning
that there is considerable leverage for corruption and
continues to afford ample opportunities for organised
crime.
Option 4: We consider the legalisation and strictly
enforced regulation of all common types of drug for
personal, non-medical use.
This is the thorny subject that needs to be debated.
It is fraught with difficulty, being laden with emotion
and with media-driven preconceptions and misconcep-
tions, but as we have stated earlier, there are now many
countries, states and regions that are fully legalising
and regulating cannabis (GDPC, 2018). We are not
proposing a “free for all”, and a range of legally bind-
ing and strictly observed caveats would be in place
concerning, in particular, the regulation, specifically
applied to the supply and distribution of currently ille-
gal substances.
When drugs are regulated, then it is also possible to
develop mature policies and practices about where and
how they should be consumed. For example, which
forms of opiate or opioid would be available and at
what potencies? The popularity of alcohol does not
extend to selling 100% ethanol in convenience stores,
or drinking whilst working. The ban on smoking in
public premises became popular even with smokers.
It would also be possible to discuss pricing and the
appropriate forms of different substances that should
be sold, with a view to reducing the social and financial
costs of illegal drug problems.
Given the reluctance of the tobacco and alcohol
industries to self-regulate, the primary imperative in
any move towards the legalisation of drugs would be
the exclusion of private enterprise from the process
beyond the production of specific substances not avail-
able via producer countries. Uruguay has nationalised
cannabis production, distribution and sale, which adds
further revenue to the national coffers (Walsh and
Ramsay, 2016). Matters such as supply, distribution
and quality would, as a necessity, require state control
(similar perhaps to models for the control of alcohol
used in Canada and some Scandinavian countries) with
scrupulous and ongoing monitoring. There are differ-
ing models emerging. The states in the US seem to have
a less regulated system for cannabis, while Uruguay
and Canada prefer much more state involvement and
greater control of the regulatory process (Government
of Canada, 2019; Walsh and Ramsay, 2016). Although
a lesson learned from Canada is that the state needs to
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be able to deliver, or users will continue to purchase
illegally.
We would like to discuss some possible implications
of legalisation on cannabis – among the most widely
used illicit psychoactive substances, and the second
most widely used psychoactive after alcohol
(UNODC, 2018).
The shift in patterns of cannabis use and manufac-
ture are making it extremely difficult to gauge, or esti-
mate, use globally. However, on the available data,
cannabis is consumed by some 75 per cent of reported
users of illicit drugs— an estimated 183 million people
reporting use in the last year (UNODC, 2017: 13).
Cannabis accounts for more than one half (53%) of
all illicit drug seizures worldwide (UNODC, 2017:
40). This, a drug which is now fully legal and available
in two UN member countries (Canada and Uruguay),
fully legal in 11 US states and available for medical use
in a further 33 (Business Insider, 2020), and not taking
into account the number of countries where its use is
decriminalised, such as Portugal and the Czech
Republic. There are numerous accounts of the econom-
ic benefits the legalisation of cannabis (Wodak et al.,
2002; Rolles et al., 2012; Room, 2014); and yet, under
the UN Single Convention (1961) we persist in attach-
ing ourselves to a diktat that has completely failed in
just about all that it set out to do.
Cannabis is consumed and grown in almost every
country, and the overall amounts produced are report-
edly far larger than the total production of other illicit
drugs. Cultivation is widely dispersed and relatively
little is known about the extent of cannabis production.
135 countries, covering 92% of the world’s population
have some sort of cannabis cultivation going on within
their borders (UNODC, 2017: 39). What these figures
from the UN tell us is that cannabis use is embedded
into most societies despite international prohibition
policies (with the exception of those mentioned
above), with reported use increasing, particularly in
the developing world.
The UNODC was established in 1997 as the Office
for Drug Control and Crime Prevention by combining
the United Nations International Drug Control
Program (UNDCP) and the Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Division in the United Nations
Office at Vienna. It is a member of the United
Nations Development Group and was renamed the
UNODC in 2002. In 2018 it had an estimated annual
budget of US$326 million. This will be a fraction of the
total worldwide law enforcement budget aimed at pre-
venting cannabis production. Consider the potential
savings made by halting the interdiction of cannabis
and legalising and regulating it instead. Consider
also, why we have a situation where, in one country
(Canada) where HRH Elizabeth II is head of state, a
commodity is legal and available, while in another
(UK), possession, supply and cultivation are criminal
offences punishable by loss of liberty.
The use of cannabis is not only widespread in North
America, Latin America and Europe, but is extremely
common on the African continent too. Indeed, the
West Africa Commission on Drugs (WADC), set up
by former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan,
reported in June 2014 that the region must embark on a
radical rethink of support for drug prohibition policies.
Olusegun Obasanjo, the commission chairman and
former president of Nigeria, reported that,
We call on West African governments to reform drug
laws and policies and decriminalise low-level and non-
violent drug offences. (WADC, 2014: 1)
While the report later states,
Decriminalising drug use is one of the most effective
ways to reduce problematic drug use as it is likely to
facilitate access to treatment for those who need it.
(WADC, 2014: 54)
There is little evidence to suggest that drug prohibition
policies, whether domestically or internationally, are
reducing the use, sale or supply of controlled drugs
predicted by the UN in 1961 (Bewley-Taylor, 2001;
GCDP, 2018; Lines, 2010; Rolles et al., 2012;
Rosmarin and Eastwood, 2012; Stevens, 2011; Trace,
2011).
McKeganey (2011) does argue, however, that
Sweden’s zero tolerance approach to drug use has
shown that tough approaches to interpreting the UN
Single Convention can succeed. His argument stresses
that a tough and consistent approach to drugs can pro-
duce results desired by the UN when he writes:
It may be necessary to adopt tougher enforcement pol-
icies, abstinence-focused treatment and widespread
prevention. (McKeganey, 2011: 145)
In isolating cannabis, McKeganey (2011) seems to have
a point, with Sweden’s cannabis using population
among the lowest in Europe. However, when we look
at Murkin (2014), what can also be seen is that
Sweden’s cannabis using population is almost the
same as Portugal’s, which decriminalised cannabis use
in 2001 (Greenwald, 2009). In effect, the levels of can-
nabis use in what are two polar policies between
Sweden and Portugal have little impact on reported
consumption prevalence. Of course, cultural and envi-
ronmental differences between these two countries can
be assumed to be a factor in decisions to use.
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Despite this, it can clearly be seen that Portugal’s can-
nabis use is comparatively very low.
Although there is nothing particularly new about
countries deciding to shape their own drug policy (as
is stated in Article 4 of the UN Single Convention
(1961), all countries have to develop their own bespoke
prohibition policy) to suit the conditions and policies
within domestic borders, it is estimated that there are
now somewhere in the region of 21 countries around
the world with some kind of formalised decriminalisa-
tion policies that challenge the global consensus created
by the 1961 UN Convention (Rosmarin and Eastwood,
2012). The Netherlands, which has the longest tradition
of employing decriminalisation policies in Europe, also
has the lowest per capita number of people who inject
heroin compared with all other EU countries.
Reporting a fall in heroin users from 30,000 in 2001
to 18,000 in 2008 (Trance, 2012: 7).
This highlights the complexity, and even the contra-
dictions, inherent in international drug prohibition
policy. How can international treaties be observed
when so many countries, are searching for a new way
of interpreting existing global legal proscriptions on cer-
tain commodities? When even the USA, the biggest
backer of this policy has its own domestic pressure to
‘soften’ its approach through the recent votes to legalise
marijuana, there is a suggestion that the Single
Convention in its present form may be dismantled
completely at some point in the future. What may be
beginning to occur is the formation of blocs within the
UN that are calling for change. Many of the Latin
American countries are examples of what may be
referred to as ‘like-minded states’, getting together to
attempt to drive the debate to higher levels (Lines, 2010).
Unintended effects of prohibition
Synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (SCRAs) were
originally developed by the pharmaceutical industry to:
have potential therapeutic uses as appetite suppressants
and as agents that improve memory. (Reggio, 2009: vi)
However, these substances emerged onto the drugs
scene in the early to mid-2000s as ‘legal highs’ or
‘new psychoactive substances’ and marketed as ‘legal
alternatives’ to cannabis. What the industry thought
would be an alternative to cannabis (a plant, which
cannot be patented) to treat ailments already associat-
ed with therapies containing THC and CBD (Reggio,
2009), soon turned out to be a particularly volatile sub-
stance with many health and social adverse
consequences.
These products, commonly known as ‘Spice’ (among
other branded names such as ‘K2’ and ‘Black
Mamba’), quickly attracted the attention of the media
in the UK and elsewhere, with various ‘zombie’ head-
lines (e.g. The Mirror, 2019) due to the extreme debil-
itating effects of the drug on its users. While this is a
fairly toxic and potent ‘version’ of cannabis, its attrac-
tion was initially due to its ‘legal’ nature, meaning users
would not be subject to prosecution under the
UKMDA (1971). The popularity of these products
has since declined though, with the introduction of
the Psychoactive Substances Act (2016), which effec-
tively criminalised SCRAs to similar extents as their
real counterpart – cannabis.
Indeed, use of SCRAs has been reduced to those on
the margins of society – targets of redtop newspapers –
often homeless with complex mental health needs.
Closely followed by those in prison, largely due to
the smoking ban and the ease with which the substance
can enter jails (Public Health England, 2015). Some
media attention has highlighted that these drugs have
managed to get a foothold in vulnerable and marginal
communities with occasional attempts from broad-
sheets in offering ‘understanding’ of the situation
(The Guardian, 2019).
If ever there was an argument for the legalisation of
cannabis, surely this is it. Very few would countenance
the use of noxious substances if there was a legal, less
harmful one available as illustrated by Grace et al.’s
(2020) study of released prisoners in England rejecting
‘Spice’ in favour of cannabis. SCRAs are rarely used
where cannabis is either legal or decriminalised.
Conclusion
The purpose of this piece is not to provide definitive
answers to what has become a serious and chronic
public health and criminal justice problem, so much
as to open the area for rational debate. The debate
surrounding drug policy has historically been shrouded
in fear of speaking out against those purporting to rep-
resent the moral majority. Morals have been used
unashamedly over time as a way of portraying drug
users as ‘the other’ (Berridge, 2013). From
Anslinger’s ‘Assassin of Youth’ (Anslinger, 1937) to
the character assassination of Prof David Nutt for
campaigning for drug law reform (Luger, 2011)
morals have shaped the policy agenda. With the
global policy landscape moving toward forms of legal-
isation, regulation and decriminalisation (GDPC,
2018), the option of nullifying debate on the issue is
becoming increasingly indefensible.
For many people, neither legalisation nor even
decriminalisation of some/all drugs will be a solution
they are prepared to countenance, but in some respects
this is beside the point, as they would not use drugs any
more than they use other things they eschew but others
6 Drug Science, Policy and Law
enjoy. There is considerable evidence to indicate that
the drug laws (national and international) are unfit for
purpose and may exacerbate the situation. We can
either re-evaluate the situation rationally and pragmat-
ically or face the prospect of fifty more years of failure.
On top of this, we are now experiencing a global
pandemic in the form of the Covid-19 virus, which
will have had numerous, as yet undocumented, nega-
tive effects on the harms experienced by many drug
users worldwide. Availability and price will no-doubt
have reduced and increased with their symbiotic rela-
tionship that will have affected patterns of use, and
even moved many from their drug of choice to more
volatile replacements. The argument for regulation of
all drugs is more relevant now than ever.
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